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Chapter 2
The Emergence of the Robo-Advisor
Jill E. Fisch, Marion Labouré, and John A. Turner

In the past ten years, the market for ﬁnancial advice has changed dramatically
with the emergence of robo-advisors, deﬁned as in Chapter 1 as automated
online services that use computer algorithms to provide ﬁnancial advice and
manage customers’ investment portfolios. This chapter describes the growth
of the robo-advisor industry and the services that robo-advisors offer. It
compares the services, quality, and cost of advice provided by robo-advisors
to those of traditional human ﬁnancial advisors. It also considers the potential
for conﬂicts of interest to affect the provision of ﬁnancial advice by both roboand human advisors.
Susan Axelrod, the Executive Vice President for Regulatory Affairs at the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), has raised several questions concerning robo-advisors, which she equates to digital services or
digital investment advice: ‘We need to ask ourselves: what role will ﬁnancial
professionals play in tandem with digital services in providing investment
advice? To what degree will investors rely primarily on digital investment
advice? How well can software know a client? Can the skill, knowledge and
service provided by well-trained and ethical ﬁnancial professionals be incorporated in software? Can that software provide sound personal advice,
especially for clients with more complex advice needs?’ (Axelrod 2017: n.p).
This chapter provides a start at answering these questions.

Background on Financial Robo-advisors
Many people ﬁnd investing to be a difﬁcult challenge, marked by complexity
on both the demand and supply sides of the market for ﬁnancial assets.
Financial markets have become more complex as more types of investments
have become available, particularly in the retail environment. In addition to
understanding the growing array of ﬁnancial products, investors must evaluate risk, the effects of compounding, the tax implications of investment
alternatives, and how to stage withdrawals from their investment portfolio
over their lifetime.
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Some people may face additional challenges in making good investment
decisions. Young people may have limited experience with ﬁnancial markets,
and some older people suffer from decreased cognition which makes ﬁnancial
decision-making more difﬁcult (Agarwal et al. 2009). A substantial fraction of
the population, both in the United States and elsewhere, lacks basic ﬁnancial
literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014), which can deter people from even trying
to save, invest, and plan for retirement. Investors with low ﬁnancial literacy are
particularly likely to make poor ﬁnancial decisions (Fisch et al. 2016).
What do robo-advisors do? Since computers are good at both routine and
highly complex tasks, computers can make it easier for clients to manage
their investments. Robo-advisors are intended to interact with clients digitally, both to gather client information and to manage the client’s investments inexpensively. A client generally creates an account online by
responding to a series of questions that may include risk preferences, assets,
income, debt, and investment goals. The robo-advisor uses computer algorithms to offer investment selections deemed appropriate in terms of asset
allocation and diversiﬁcation based on the information supplied by the
client. These selections most typically include low cost mutual funds and
exchange traded funds (ETFs). Robos invest the client’s portfolio in accordance with the recommended asset allocation, which can typically be modiﬁed by the client. Robos also manage their clients’ portfolios on an ongoing
basis, providing services that include automatically rebalancing the portfolio
periodically to maintain the desired asset allocation, and reinvesting dividends, redemptions, and interest payments. Some robos also harvest tax
losses in taxable portfolios (Berger 2015).
Robo-advisors can differ along several dimensions (Berger 2015). Some
require clients to transfer their assets to the robo-advisor’s custodian, while
others allow clients to keep their investments at external brokerage houses.
Most robo-advisors offer advice concerning taxable accounts and IRA
retirement accounts, although some do not offer advice concerning complex account structures such as SEP-IRA accounts for the self-employed.
Some robos manage other specialized accounts such as 529 college savings
accounts.
Robos also offer different types of investments: most limit investors to
speciﬁc ETFs or mutual funds selected by that advisor, while others offer
more ﬂexibility, such as allowing customers to invest in individual stocks.
Another difference among robo-advisors is the range of advice that they
offer. Many robos limit themselves to portfolio management and do not
address, for example, retirement planning, estate planning, or insurance
issues. In some cases, a robo will only provide advice with respect to the
assets that it is managing; in other cases, the advisor, when preparing an
investment plan, has the capacity to consider assets not under its management, such as an employer-sponsored 401k plan.
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In addition to asset allocation and diversiﬁcation, robo-advisors generally
rebalance clients’ portfolios. For example, Wealthfront (2017b) rebalances
its customers’ portfolios in taxable accounts by reinvesting dividends and
new contributions in underweighted asset classes, so that no tax liability is
generated by selling assets to rebalance. That ﬁrm argues that rebalancing
in this way is one of the advantages it offers over many human advisors. It
should be noted that robo-advisors are not necessary for rebalancing, since
this service is also provided by target date funds, balanced funds, and
managed accounts, among others.
Some robo-advisors offer tax loss harvesting which involves selling investments that have lost value to offset the taxes on investments with realized capital
gains. Tax loss harvesting is relevant for taxable accounts but not for taxpreferenced accounts such as retirement accounts. In addition, Betterment
offers customers real-time tax information through a ‘Tax Impact Preview’
calculator (Khentov 2014). When clients decide to sell an asset, Betterment
calculates the likely tax liability that these sales could generate. This feature can
mitigate clients’ tendency to sell in response to a market downturn.
One type of robo-advisor that has received little attention to date is
online advice programs offered to pension participants through their
401k plans. Firms such as Financial Engines have long operated in this
space (Toonkel and Randall 2015). For instance, Reuter and Richardson
(2017) investigated the use of online advice by participants in plans where
TIAA was the sole record keeper. They reported that about 6.5 percent of
participants studied sought asset allocation advice using an online TIAA
tool in 2012 and 2013.
Robo-advisory ﬁrms tend to describe what they do as providing investors
with asset allocations appropriate to their needs and offering ﬁnancial
advice at a lower cost than traditional human advisors. They market their
ability to serve clients who previously received no ﬁnancial advice because
they lacked sufﬁcient investible assets. The advantages in terms of cost and
access raise the question as to why more assets are not currently managed by
robo-advisors. One reason is that any innovation takes time to become
widely accepted. Nevertheless, human advisors may still offer services that
robos cannot, leading to the emergence of a hybrid model in which some
ﬁrms pair robo advice with access to a human advisor.
How are robo-advisors regulated? The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversees the enforcement of the federal securities law and, as a
result, has the job of protecting US investors in the securities markets (SEC
2017). One way it does so is to regulate the services provided by human and
robo-advisors, both of which must register under the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 as Registered Investment Advisers (RIAs). RIAs are subject to the
substantive obligations imposed by that statute and have a ﬁduciary duty
to provide advice in the best interest of their clients (Lazaroff 2016).
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In addition, if robo-advisors hold customer assets, they must register with the
SEC and FINRA as broker-dealers. Currently Betterment holds customers’
assets and is a registered broker-dealer, while Wealthfront is not.
The scope of protection afforded by the RIA’s ﬁduciary duty has been the
subject of extensive debate. Some commentators argue that the ﬁduciary
concept is weak or vague and operates with a lack of predictability for both
advisors and customers (Jordan 2012). The precise requirements imposed
by the ﬁduciary relationship can be modiﬁed by contract (Klass and
Perelman 2019). In addition, many aspects of the ﬁduciary obligation may
be undermined by disclosure and client consent. Under US law, ﬁnancial
advisors are permitted to have a conﬂict of interest so long as they disclose
the conﬂict to their clients. Nevertheless, disclosure of conﬂicts of interest
may be ineffective in protecting the interests of clients, both because of
clients’ actions and because of advisors’ actions. In one experiment, Cain
et al. (2005) found that people generally did not take into account the biases
caused by conﬂicts of interest as much as they should. Some people may
believe that disclosure reveals an advisor to be trustworthy, so disclosure may
enhance trust in the advisor. Others may feel that it would be insulting to an
advisor to question whether the advisor was acting in their best interests.
One potential advantage of robo-advisors is that the quality of their advice
may be easier to review, than it is for human ﬁnancial advisors. While it would
be impossible to monitor all private conversations that ﬁnancial advisors have
with their clients, it is conceptually feasible to evaluate computer models’
advice (GAO 2011). This greater transparency may lead robo-advisors to
adhere more closely than some human advisors to regulatory requirements.
These regulatory requirements continue to evolve. In 2016, the US
Department of Labor (2016) outlined a new Fiduciary Rule seeking to impose
a ﬁduciary duty on all ﬁnancial professionals, including robo-advisors, who
provide advice regarding retirement plan investing (US Dept. of Labor 2016).
That rule was subsequently invalidated by a federal court.1 In 2018, the
SEC issued for comment its own proposed ﬁduciary rule – Regulation Best
Interest (SEC 2018).
In 2017, the SEC’s Division of Investment Management released regulatory compliance guidance for robo-advisors (SEC 2017). The guidance
observed that the unique business model of the robo-advisor raises concerns
and emphasized the obligation of robo-advisors to address these concerns.
These concerns included the need for adequate disclosure about the roboadvisor and the services it provides, the need to ensure that the robo-advisor
is providing suitable advice to its customers, and the need to adopt and
implement appropriate compliance programs tailored to the automated
nature of the robo’s services.
Evolution of the robo-advisor industry. The ﬁrst consumer-facing
robo-advisors, Wealthfront and Betterment, began operations in 2008,2 yet
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neither company offered ﬁnancial advice to retail investors until 2010.
Wealthfront began as a mutual fund company, KaChing, and it originally
used human advisors, not robots, in furtherance of a business model
providing high-quality asset management at a lower cost and without the
substantial minimum investments required by other professional advisors
(Ha 2010). The original objective of Wealthfront’s founders, Andy Rachleff
and Dan Carroll, was to provide ﬁnancial advice to the tech community
(Taulli 2012). Wealthfront’s founders shifted the company’s focus when
they realized the potential that computer software offered for making investment advice accessible to more people at lower cost (Wealthfront 2017a).
Betterment’s co-founder Jon Stein sought to automate the process of
selecting and managing investments (Betterment 2017b). The ﬁrm offers
ﬁnancial advice at a lower cost than traditional ﬁnancial advisors, yet the key
element of the Betterment strategy is to make investing simple for its clients.
In recent years, additional ﬁrms have started to offer robo-advisory services. A BlackRock (2016) study noted 22 new robo-advisory ﬁrms launched
in the US in 2014 and 44 in 2015. The ﬁrst robo-advisors were stand-alone
ﬁrms, but many existing ﬁnancial ﬁrms including banks, broker-dealers,
technology ﬁrms, and asset managers, have now entered the market.
Assets managed by robo-advisors have continued to grow, with robos
managing $200 billion in assets worldwide in 2017 (Eule 2018). They are
likely to continue to grow in the coming years, although estimates of that
growth vary considerably, from $0.82 trillion in 2020 of global assets under
management (Statista 2017), to $2.2 trillion (Regan 2015) and $8.1 trillion
(Kocianski 2016). As of early 2018, the largest US (and worldwide) roboadvisors in terms of assets managed were Vanguard ($101 billion) and
Charles Schwab ($27 billion). Betterment had $13 billion in assets under
management, and Wealthfront had $10 billion. Other robo-advisors
included Rebalance IRA, Acorns, and SigFig, and the market continues to
expand, as is outlined in Table 2.1. Notably, although robo-advisors are
TABLE . Selected top US robo-advisor by assets under management, ﬁrst quarter
2018
Robo advisor

$AuM
(billion)

Advisory fee as % of AuM (excludes
fee for investment in funds)

Minimum
assets

Vanguard Personal
Advisor Services
Charles Schwab
Betterment

$101

0.30%

$50,000

$27
$13

$5,000
$0

Wealthfront

$10

0 (fees for Schwab ETFs)
Digital—0.25%/year
Premium—0.40%/year
0.25% (free for accounts of $10,000 or less)

Source : Data from Backend Benchmarking (2018).

$500

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/8/2019, SPi

18 The Impact of FinTech on Retirement Systems

growing rapidly, they still control only a small fraction of the $80 trillion of
global assets under management (Kelly 2017).

Who Uses Robo-advisors?
Despite their appeal, only 5 percent of US investors invest with robos, while
55 percent have not heard about them at all (Wells Fargo 2016). Figure 2.1
traces the evidence. Part of the reason for the lack of familiarity with roboadvisors stems from the broader reality that only about one-third of Americans currently seeks ﬁnancial advice of any sort (Collins 2012). Researchers
have documented widespread evidence of low ﬁnancial literacy in the
population (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014) for which ﬁnancial advice could
be an effective substitute (Fisch et al. 2016). Nonetheless, ﬁnancial advice is
not widely used perhaps because consumers view it as too expensive or
because they lack sufﬁcient few assets to make it worthwhile to work with a
ﬁnancial advisor.
At the same time, over half of Americans (56%) who hold ﬁnancial assets
outside of pension plans do consult with a ﬁnancial advisor (FINRA 2016a).
The most important reasons people give for using a ﬁnancial advisor
are to improve investment performance and to help avoid losses (FINRA
2016a: 7). Nearly two-thirds also feel it is important to learn about investment opportunities, and over half feel it is important to have access to
investments they would not otherwise be able to buy. Most investors who
5%
12%
A lot
A fair amount
Only a little
55%

Nothing
28%

Figure 2.1 US investors’ familiarity with robo-advisors
Note: Participants were asked: ‘How much have you heard or read about robo-advisors before
now? Robo-advisors are digital advisory services that use computer algorithms to select stocks
and other investments for people based on the information people provide about their risk
tolerance and goals.’
Source: Data from Gallup (2016).
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use an advisor (80 percent) have a speciﬁc person with whom they work.
Seventy-three percent have communicated with their advisor by telephone
or email at least two to three times in the past year, and 80 per cent have met
in person with their advisor (FINRA 2016a). When people must devote time
and money to acquire ﬁnancial knowledge, which can reduce opportunities
to invest in one’s own job, outsourcing ﬁnancial management can make
sense (Kim et al. 2016).
To date, the evidence shows that younger people, in their 20s and 30s, are
more likely to use robo-advisors than are older people. For example, a
FINRA (2016a) study found that 38 percent of Americans between 18 and
34 with investments outside a pension had used a robo-advisor, versus 4
percent of those over 55. The average age of Betterment’s clients is 36, a
number that will rise as young robo users age (Wang and Padley 2017). The
age tilt may be due to the fact that the young are often more comfortable
with technology than are older individuals (Polyak 2015). Additionally,
younger people’s smaller asset base makes then less suitable clients for
traditional ﬁnancial advisors (Stein 2016).

Robos versus Human Advisors
Over 70 percent of US investors currently believe that human advisors are
better than robo-advisors, according to a recent Gallup (2016) survey. That
is, investors see human advisors as better serving their interests, making
good investment recommendations, taking clients’ entire ﬁnancial picture
into account, advising clients on risks they are taking, making people feel
conﬁdent about their investment, and helping clients understand their
investments (see Figure 2.2).
Several features of robo-advisors distinguish them from human advisors:
Fees and costs. Human ﬁnancial advisors generally charge fees of 1–2 per
cent of assets under management, with larger portfolios paying the lower
fees in the US (Ludwig 2017). By contrast, robo-advisors typically charge
substantially less, with fees ranging from 0 to 50 basis points. Betterment, for
example, initially charged 15 basis points for accounts with more than
$100,000 and 35 basis points for the smallest accounts, but it has since
moved to charging 25 basis points for all accounts (and for accounts that
exceed $2 million, fees are capped). For an account of about $50,000, a
traditional ﬁnancial advisor would charge 100 basis points or $500 a year,
versus Betterment which charges $125 per year. With $12 billion assets
under management at year-end 2017, Betterment’s fee structure generated
annual revenue of $30 million.
Other comparisons include Wealthfront, which, as of the time this chapter is written, requires a minimum account balance of $500 and charges 25
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Helps you understand your investments
Makes people feel confident about their investments
Advises clients on risks they are taking
Takes each client’s entire financial picture into…
Is focused on investor’s best interests
Makes good investment recommendations
Matches client investments to their risk tolerance
Is more reliable in turbulent markets
Simplifies the investing process for investors
Charges lower fees
0

10

20

30

40

50

Human advisor (%)

60

70

80

90

100

Robo-advisor (%)

Figure 2.2 US investors’ perceptions of human vs. robo-advice
Note : Investors were asked whether each statement applies more to robo-advisors or more to
human advisors. Results for the Wells Fargo/Gallup Investor and Retirement Optimism Index
survey are based on questions asked May 13–22, 2016, on the Gallup Daily tracking survey, of a
random sample of 1,019 US adults having investable assets of $10,000 or more.
Source : Robo Advisors Europe (2018).

basis points, while accounts of $10,000 or under are managed for free.
T. Rowe Price and Schwab currently charge no fee for their robo-advisors
but are compensated via fees on investment products sold to their clients.
Ellevest (2018), a robo-advisor that markets to female clients, charges a fee
of 25 basis points for its basic digital service and 50 basis points for its
premium service.
Robo-advisors can charge lower fees than human advisors because they
have the advantage of economies of scale: that is, a single computer algorithm is used to service many clients. By contrast, a human advisor might
have 75 or at most 100 clients (Kitces 2017d); if that advisor had one support
staff person, this would entail at most 50 clients per employee. Betterment,
by contrast, has over 300,000 clients and 200 employees, so its client-to-staff
ratio is 1,500 (Kitces 2017d). Over time as robos acquire more clients with
more assets, these fees should fall even further, making ﬁnancial advice
accessible to a larger market of people who are unwilling or unable to pay
the fees associated with human ﬁnancial advisors.
Another factor differentiating robo from human advisors is that the
former generally use passive index-fund approaches to investing (Lam
2016). By contrast, human advisors tend to recommend higher-fee
actively-managed approaches (Kramer 2016). As a result, robo-advisors not
only have lower advisory fees, but they also spend less on trades and charge
lower investment management fees. For example, Betterment clients pay
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9–12 basis points on investments plus 25 bps for an advisory fee (Betterment
2017a). There are, however, robo-advisors that take an active approach to
investing which costs more (Napach 2017).
In addition, human advisors may require clients to have minimum investable assets of $100,000 or more (Ludwig 2017), whereas robo-advisors are
willing to take customers with much lower balances. Wealthfront, for example,
requires a minimum balance of only $500, and Betterment requires no minimum balance. Accordingly, robo-advisors may offer an opportunity to democratize ﬁnance and disrupt the wealth management sector through their
low-cost, accessible business models (Braunstein and Labouré 2017).
Convenience of access. The absence of a human component means that
robo-advisors are available to their clients anytime and anywhere, providing
a greater level of convenience for clients than previously available. This is
particularly appealing to the younger more tech-savvy generation.

Limitations of Robo-advisors
Warm body effect. When comparing robo to human advisors, it can be
difﬁcult to measure objectively some of the potential value of working with
humans. For instance, human advisors can help their clients overcome
limited ﬁnancial literacy, understand and adjust their levels of risk aversion,
and tolerate market volatility. Whether robo-advisors can provide these
services to the same degree is unclear but is the subject of on-going research.
For instance, Betterment has found that it helps to contact its actively
engaged clients during market downturns. By contrast, contacting clients
who are not actively engaged may backﬁre because some do not pay attention to stock market ﬂuctuations (Egan 2017).
There is also evidence that people are more likely to seek investment
advice from a person than from a company that provides only online advice.
For instance, a recent Retirement Conﬁdence Survey showed that 64 percent of pension participants said they would prefer advice from an independent ﬁnancial advisor, versus only 28 percent favoring ﬁnancial advice
from an online source (Greenwald et al. 2017).
Quality of advice. Several challenges arise when comparing and evaluating
the quality of ﬁnancial advice provided by robos versus human advisors. One
has to do with the advisor’s recommended asset allocation. Historically,
equity investments have outperformed ﬁxed income, particularly during
the rise of the robo-advisory industry. Accordingly, an advisor’s performance
will be heavily inﬂuenced by the degree to which that advisor’s recommended portfolio has been concentrated in equities over the past decade.
For example, FINRA (2016b) compared the advice of seven robo-advisors
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for a hypothetical 27-year-old, ﬁnding that the robos’ portfolio allocations to
equities varied from 51 to 90 percent.
Market competition may lead robo-advisors to over-concentrate in equities
so as to report higher returns and attract more clients, but such a strategy
would operate to the detriment of customers in a market downturn. Of
course, without additional information on the clients’ risk preferences, it is
difﬁcult to judge the appropriateness of the portfolio that an advisor recommends. In 2017, the rates of return earned by robo-advisors Betterment
(16 percent), Vanguard (16%), Schwab (15 percent) and Personal Capital
(14 percent) outperformed the weighted average return of a 60/40
equity/ﬁxed income mix. Robo-advisors’ two-year performance for
2016–2017—a period of strong equity market performance—was even better
(Eule 2018). Not surprisingly, most advisors that performed better than the
benchmark had a higher allocation to equity. For instance, Betterment,
Schwab, and Personal Capital had, respectively, 87, 93, and 94 per cent of
their portfolios allocated to equity vs. 13, 0, and 2 percent to ﬁxed income in
Q1 2018 (see Figure 2.3). It is difﬁcult to evaluate these allocations without
more information about the advisors’ customers.
These differences in asset allocation can be overcome by evaluating
returns on a risk-adjusted basis, but this gives rise to another question: that
is, do robo-advisors actually tailor recommended portfolios’ risk proﬁles
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
Charles
Schwab

Personal
Capital

Betterment
2016

Benchmark

Vanguard

2017

Figure 2.3 2016–17 Returns of selected robo-advisors vs. benchmark
Note: Benchmark is calculated based on a 60 percent ﬁxed income indices (US 10-Year Bond
Yield) and 40 percent Equity (S&P 500) weighted average return.
Source: Data from Backend Benchmarking (2018).
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appropriately for their customers’ needs? Stein (2016) found that roboadvisors gave different advice even when their questionnaires were answered in a standardized way. Rappaport and Turner (2010) found a similar
result for online retirement planning software. Of course, asset allocation
differences resulting from product differentiation are to be expected, but
robo-advisors do not appear to brand themselves based on differences in
their approach to investment risk.
Another concern is that standard questionnaires seeking to elicit risk
preferences may not be very accurate. Kitces (2017a) has noted that a
wealthy person with a capacity for bearing risk but who is deeply risk averse
would be placed in a moderately risky portfolio because of his or her wealth,
in effect overlooking the client’s unwillingness to bear risk. He contends
that risk bearing and risk tolerance scores should not be added together, but
instead they should be treated as separate constraints. Thus, a person with a
high capacity for bearing risk but a low risk tolerance would be put in a lowrisk portfolio; and a person with a low capacity for bearing risk but a highrisk tolerance would also be put in a low-risk portfolio.
Robo-advisors’ approach to risk aversion can also be compared to target
date funds. An advantage robo-advisors have over target date funds is that
they help clients pick investments appropriate for their levels of risk tolerance, not just their ages (Fisch and Turner 2018). On the other hand, Porter
(2018: n.p.) argued: ‘robo-advisers do provide value, but they provide the
most value to clients with large taxable accounts and complex goals that are
not suited to a simple target date fund. People who are simply saving for
retirement or who don’t have huge balances in taxable accounts will ﬁnd
that the beneﬁts are offset by the fees.’
Scope of advice. Robos differ according to the share of the client’s assets
over which the robo has purview (Weisser 2016). In some cases, the roboadvisor may know only one of the client’s accounts, and it may also
not consider the client’s spouse’s assets. Naturally, similar limitations will
be relevant to human ﬁnancial advisors, but human advisors may be more
sensitive to signals that prompt them to inquire about other client assets.
A related issue is the extent to which robo-advisors deal with complexity
and variation in their customers’ needs. FINRA (2016b: 8) raised the regulatory question: ‘What information is necessary to build a customer proﬁle
with sufﬁcient information to make a sound investment recommendation?’
It concluded that most robo-advisors have between ﬁve and eight investor
proﬁles, though some advisors have considerably more. It found that ‘clientfacing digital advice tools rely on a discrete set of . . . between four and twelve
questions, generally falling into ﬁve broad categories: personal information,
ﬁnancial information, investment objective, time horizon and risk tolerance’ (FINRA 2016b: 9).
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Human advisors can offer customers a more personalized approach if
they are not limited to standardized formats for gathering customer information. Even when human advisors start with a standard form, face-to-face
discussion can enable the advisor to evaluate the intensity of the customer’s
preferences and to adjust accordingly. How often this happens in practice is
unclear. For instance, one Canadian study found that ﬁnancial advisors
tended to ignore differences in risk preferences across their clients and
instead recommended the same portfolio for all (Foerster et al. 2017). That
study also reported that an advisor’s own portfolio was a good predictor of
his or her clients’ portfolios.
Regulatory requirements are unclear as to the level of personalization
required of a broker or ﬁnancial advisor. Brokers are subject to FINRA’s
suitability requirement which provides that when making a recommendation, a broker-dealer must use reasonable diligence to obtain and analyze a
customer’s investment proﬁle. This proﬁle includes, but is not limited to,
‘the customer’s age, other investments, ﬁnancial situation and needs, tax
status, investment objectives, investment experience, investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk tolerance, and any other information the customer
may disclose to the member or associated person in connection with such
recommendation’ (FINRA 2016b: 8, quoting FINRA Rule 2111, Suitability).
The suitability rule also notes that ‘the level of importance of each factor
may vary depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.’
FINRA’s rules do not apply, however, to ﬁnancial advisors that are not
broker-dealers and are regulated solely by the SEC.
It is also worth noting that human advisors’ ability to tailor their advice to
a speciﬁc customer may not always be an advantage. Tailored advice is
problematic if human advisors are subject to bias based on the customer’s
age, race, gender, or other observables. A possible advantage of roboadvisors is that they may be less subject to this potential for bias.
Financial advisors help customers deal with complexity in the investing
process by providing customers with advice on how to invest their money to
meet their ﬁnancial goals and providing ongoing portfolio management
(Glassman 2017). In doing so, advisors face a trade-off between customizing
client services and the number of clients they can serve. A ﬁnancial
advisor will generally consider a customer’s existing wealth and income,
ﬁnancial goals, risk tolerance, and tax status in developing and implementing an investment strategy. Because of the cost of ﬁnancial advisors, they
tend to focus on clients in the top 20 percent of the income distribution
(Kitces 2017d).
Financial advisors can also provide ﬁnancial planning for a broader range
of topics than robo-advisors usually do. For example, some advisors counsel
on insurance and estate planning (Kitces 2017b), recommend actively
traded mutual funds, and provide access to a broader range of products
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such as commodities, options, and alternative investments. Thus, they may
be better for sophisticated, higher-net worth customers for whom those
investments are more likely to be appropriate. Nevertheless, problems
have been identiﬁed with human ﬁnancial advice on these topics, such as
recommending costly or unnecessary insurance products or recommending
that clients rollover assets from a relatively low-fee 401k plan to a higher-fee
IRA (Turner and Klein 2014).
There is no ﬁrm consensus regarding the effectiveness of ﬁnancial advisors. Some studies suggest advisors can improve portfolio performance, but
other research warns of potential negative consequences related to the
relationship. On the downside, advisors may cater to uninformed clients
while sometimes recommending unsuitable products (Anagol et al. 2017).
In addition, client’s behavioral biases and misconceptions are not always
effectively addressed by advisors (Bergstresser et al. 2009; Mullainathan et al.
2012) and broker-sold funds tend not to outperform benchmarks
(Bergstresser et al. 2009, Chalmers and Reuter 2015). On the upside, clients
can improve their portfolio’s efﬁciency by following unbiased computergenerated advice (Bhattacharya et al. 2012), and individuals who have participated in consultations with a ﬁnancial planner tend to have higher net
worth and retirement wealth (Finke 2013).
Conﬂicts of interest. One potential difference between robo-advisors and
human advisors is the possibility for conﬂicts of interest to affect the quality
of ﬁnancial advice. Some human ﬁnancial advisors have been criticized for
providing investment advice and recommending products that generated
conﬂicts of interest (Council of Economic Advisers 2015). Robo-advisors
may be less vulnerable to the potential for conﬂicts of interest to the extent
that they are independent and do not sponsor or sell the investments that
they recommend. Additionally, robo-advisors tend to charge a ﬂat fee based
on assets under management rather than a fee that varies depending on the
investment choices made by the client or its advisor. In addition, because
robo-advisors compete based on fees, their fees are generally more transparent than for human ﬁnancial advisors.
These differences depend on the structure and business model of the
advisor in question. As Klass and Perelman (2016: 11) explained, ‘[d]igital
advisory offerings are typically comprised of ETFs that, in comparison to
mutual funds, offer little room for revenue streams and payment shares that
would otherwise create a conﬂict of interest for investment advisors (e.g., 12b-1
fees, subtransfer agent fees). The absence of such compensation factors
means that comparatively fewer conﬂicts of interest are present even where
digital advisors are afﬁliated with some of the ETFs that they recommend, and
independent digital advisors reduce such conﬂicts even further.’
Similarly, as FINRA (2016b: 6) noted, ‘[f]irm vs. client conﬂicts, however,
may remain present for both ﬁnancial professional- and client-facing digital
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advice tools, for example if a ﬁrm offers products or services from an afﬁliate
or receives payments or other beneﬁts from providers of the products or
services.’ Lam (2016) argued that Schwab Intelligent Portfolios held an
unusually large amount in cash at Schwab Bank, allowing the ﬁrm to proﬁt
from the difference between the rate of return the bank pays and the rate of
return it receives on lending. He also noted that Schwab Intelligent Portfolios charged higher expense ratios for its ETFs than did the largest robos,
Betterment and Wealthfront.
It is worth noting that robos can also face conﬂicts of interest. When they
offer different levels of service with different fees, they confront a conﬂict if
they recommend the service generating the highest revenues to the ﬁrm. In
addition, pension rollovers generate a conﬂict of interest for robos because
encouraging rollovers also boosts their fees. The total fees Betterment charges
are roughly 35 basis points (25 bps for advisory fee and 10 bps for asset
management fee). By comparison, in a study of fees in 401k plans, 10 percent
of the 525 plans surveyed had an ‘all-in’ fee of 28 basis points, while 10 percent
had an ‘all-in’ fee of 138 basis points (Deloitte Consulting 2011). Thus, the
fees Betterment charged were lower than the fees of many 401k plans, but
most 401k participants are in large plans that tend to charge lower fees.

Trends in Robo-advisors
This section considers several trends in robo-advisors in the United States.
The ﬁrst is a move to human-robo hybrids; the second is a move to greater
product or service diversiﬁcation in other aspects; and the third is toward
vertical integration. These all provide a way for incumbents in the market to
compete against the pure robo-advisors, as well as to gain distribution
channels. A fourth trend is the use of robo-advisors by human advisors.
The move to hybrids. Some ﬁnancial advisory companies have begun to
combine features of robo-advisors and traditional human advisors, creating
a type of hybrid. Hybrids charge lower fees than traditional advisors by
automating part of the investment process, but they still offer the possibility
of talking with a ﬁnancial advisor.
The stand-alone robo-advisor movement is also slowly declining in relative
importance, as robo-advisors are acquired by other ﬁnancial ﬁrms such as
custodian and broker-dealer companies. Some of the traditional ﬁnancial
management companies such as Vanguard and Schwab have incorporated
robo-advisors into their business model, Schwab being the ﬁrst to use the
hybrid approach. This development, while increasing competition, has also
given added credibility to the use of robo-advisors. Vanguard’s Personal
Advisor Services charged 30 basis points and required an account minimum
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of $50,000 in 2018. Schwab Intelligent Advisory charged 28 basis points with
an account minimum of $25,000 and offers ‘unlimited’ contact with a
Certiﬁed Financial Planner 24/7. Schwab Intelligent Advisory combined
Schwab Intelligent Portfolios plus the availability of human advisors. It
provided comprehensive ﬁnancial planning services, not just portfolio management, which it implemented with the Schwab robo model (Kitces 2016).
Both the Schwab and Vanguard services involved contact with human
advisors, so neither was a pure robo-advisor.
In 2017, T. Rowe Price began offering a robo-advisor, ActivePlus Portfolios, reﬂecting its emphasis on active portfolio management. Advisors could
only select T. Rowe Price funds. There was no extra investment management fee. The robo-advisor service was available to clients with at least
$50,000 in the portfolios managed by this program (Kitces 2017c). The
program only managed IRA money, so presumably there were no tax consequences associated with trading. The fact that it only managed money
invested in an IRA with a minimum of $50,000 made the service unavailable
to most young people. The program offered a call-in center where participants could talk to advisors, as well as online access to client managers.
A website allowed a client to see how the allocation of a portfolio between
stocks and ﬁxed income would vary based on the personal information
provided (T. Rowe Price 2017). For example, the program recommended
that a person aged 25 with medium risk tolerance invest in a portfolio of 88.5
percent stocks and 11.5 percent bonds, while a person with the same risk
tolerance who was aged 67 was advised to invest in a portfolio with 58.5
stocks and 41.5 percent ﬁxed income.
Wells Fargo began offering a robo-advisor service in 2017, requiring a
minimum investment of $10,000. It was a hybrid service, offering the possibility of speaking to an advisor. It offered seven different portfolios, with a
fee of 50 basis points including the expense ratio for the investments and the
advice fee (Saacks 2017).
The hybrid business model has spread to the original robo-advisor space.
In 2017, Betterment opened a call center and began offering three levels of
service. Betterment Digital was the classic robo advice offering with no
account minimums, costing 25 basis points (the same fee charged by
Wealthfront). Betterment Premium required a $100,000 minimum balance
and cost 40 basis points for unlimited access to a ‘team of CFP professionals
and licensed ﬁnancial experts’ (Benke 2017: n.p). Customers looking for
even more hands-on advice could use a dedicated ﬁnancial advisor assisted
by Betterment for Advisors (Neal 2017). These changes were designed to
attract wealthier clients than those typically using the basic robo-advisor
approach. In 2016 and 2017, about one-third of the assets Betterment
managed were owned by investors aged 50 or older, who typically had larger
portfolios than did younger investors (Weisser 2016; Kitces 2017d).
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Greater product diversiﬁcation. With the growing number of entrants into
the robo-advisor market, there has also been a move toward greater product
diversiﬁcation. This is a common pattern in product development as markets
mature. It means that robo-advisors need to differentiate themselves with
respect to the services they provide instead of competing primarily on fees.
Some robo-advisors offer specialized services to attract a demographic or
interest group. For example, because the ﬁnancial advice industry is supposedly male-oriented in the services it provides, some robo-advisors instead
focused on attracting female clients. SheCapital was founded in 2015 to
target the speciﬁc needs of women investors (Malito 2015), but the ﬁrm
went out of business after a year because of its inability to attract a sufﬁcient
number of clients (Malito 2016). In 2016, Ellevest started as a robo-advisor
catering to women. The premise was that because women have longer life
expectancies than men, they need to have different portfolios from men the
same age (Weisser 2016). Ellevest clientele are well educated—more than
40 percent have a master’s degree or doctorate (Ellevest 2017).
True Link focused on older investors and retirees (True Link 2017), while
United Income was also oriented toward people near or in retirement.
Several robo-advisors, including OpenInvest and Earthfolio, offered investors the opportunity to combine socially responsible investing with a robo
platform (Skinner 2017b). The fees of these specialized ﬁrms were higher
than those of the original robo-advisors.
The original robo-advisors have also expanded the range of products and
services that they offer over time. In 2017, Betterment began offering three
new options: a fund that took socially responsible investing criteria into
account, a low-risk alternative to its standard fund, and a high-risk alternative, which is its Goldman Sachs Smart Beta portfolio. The high-risk fund
invests based on factors such as the momentum or the quality of a stock. The
same year, Betterment also began offering a program for charitable giving
(Betterment 2017c). The client speciﬁes the amount of the desired donation, and Betterment picks the asset that has the most unrealized capital
gains to donate to that charity. In this way, the client gets to contribute and
deduct the full value of the security, rather than ﬁrst selling the security,
paying tax on the capital gains, and then contributing the after-tax amount.
Robo-advisors are also expanding their operations into a broader range of
ﬁnancial services. For example, Betterment offers Betterment for Business,
providing record keeping and asset management services for 401k plans. It
also offers Betterment for Advisors, providing asset management services for
ﬁnancial advisors.
Vertical integration—robo-advisors as distribution channels. From the perspective of the ﬁnancial services industry, robo-advisors function as distribution channels for ﬁnancial products. Some providers of ﬁnancial products
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have also purchased or started robo-advisors as a way to distribute their
products (Kitces 2017d). Such vertical integration is one way for incumbent
ﬁnancial service providers to compete with the start-up robo-advisors.
Schwab started Schwab Intelligent Portfolios, in which the portfolios primarily consist of its own proprietary products. BlackRock purchased FutureAdvisor as a platform to distribute its ETFs. Similarly, Invesco purchased
Jemstep to distribute its ETFs. Wisdom Tree invested heavily in AdvisorEngine to distribute its ETFs. Northwestern Mutual purchased LearnVest, and
Interactive brokers Online purchased Covestor (Hooper and Andress 2016).
By contrast, the CEO of Betterment, Jon Stein, has indicated that he would
prefer an IPO for Betterment rather than being bought by a large investment
management company because this would preserve its independence relating to its choice of investments (Wang and Padley 2017).
The use of robo-advisors by human advisors. A further trend is the use of
robo-advisors by human advisors. Human advisors can become more efﬁcient by using robo-advisors to help them advise their clients and manage
client investments. For example, Riskalyze only deals with registered ﬁnancial advisors. Its technology helps advisors determine the risk tolerance of
their clients and use that information to construct portfolios that are appropriate for the clients. By analyzing the risk of the prospects’ investment
holdings, the software allows ﬁnancial advisors to show prospects whether
their investment portfolios have the appropriate amount of risk (Riskalyze
2018). Raymond James Financial announced in 2017 that its 7,100 advisors
would have access to a robo-advisor platform that they could use as a tool for
advising clients (Skinner 2017a).

Robo-advisors Internationally
Although robo-advisors began in the United States, the concept has spread
to other countries. In Europe, robo-advisors are a relatively new concept.
The number of robo advisors in Europe has increased signiﬁcantly since
2014, and the amount of money robo-advisors manage has also grown
rapidly (Table 2.2). Most European robo advisors operate at the national
level (rather than internationally) due to legislative and regulatory constraints. However, some such as Quirion operate in several countries. In
June 2017, BlackRock took a stake in the Anglo-German digital investment
manager Scalable Capital. Robo-advisors now operate in Canada (12),
France (17), the United Kingdom (20), Switzerland (12), Germany (31),
Italy (5), China (20), Japan (14), Singapore (8), India (19), and Australia
(8). By contrast, there are 200 robo-advisors in the United States. However,
robo-advisors are rare in South America (3) (Burnmark 2017).
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TABLE . Selected features of European robo-advisors, 2018
Robo-advisor

Available
countries

Advisory fee as % of
AuM (does not include
fee for investments in
funds)

Account
minimum

Investment
instruments

Nutmeg

United
Kingdom

0.75%–0.25% asset
management fee on
invested money
0.20% fund management
fee on invested money
(min £100/months for
accounts below £5,000)

£500

ETFs

Quirion

Germany

0.48% for asset
management fee
0.39% fund management
fee on invested money

€10,000

ETFs

Switzerland
Marie Quantier

France

5% on proﬁts made
Trading commissions
from interactive brokers
apply with a minimum of
USD 10 per month

€5,000

ETFs

Ginmon

Germany

0.39% for asset
management fee
10% on proﬁts made
0.37% fund management
fee

€5,000 or
€1,000 with a
reinvestment
of €50 per
month

ETFs

Wealth Horizon

United
Kingdom

0.25% on invested money
0.75% for asset
management fee on
invested money
0.18% for fund
management fee on
invested money

£1,000

ETFs

Wealthify

United
Kingdom

0.7% (under £10,000) to
0.5% (over £250,000) for
asset management fee on
invested money

£250

ETFs

Note: ETF refers to Exchange Traded Fund.
Source : Authors’ collection of data from robo-advisor websites (Robo Advisors Europe, 2018).
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Although it is difﬁcult to generalize about the European market, roboadvisors there tend to charge higher fees than US robo-advisors, from 40 to
100 basis points (e.g., Nutmeg, Quirion, Marie Quantier). The higher fees
may be due to the fact that robo-advisors are a relatively new phenomenon
in Europe. In addition, European ﬁnancial and banking legislation differs
across countries, resulting in many different national markets for roboadvisors rather than a single centralized European market. Also, European
citizens may tend to be more risk-averse than Americans, resulting in more
saving and safer investments (Laidi 2010). These factors may have led
European robo-advisors to grow slowly, reducing their ability to beneﬁt
from economies of scale.

Conclusion
Whether robo-advisors will be better generally for investors than human
advisors in the long run remains to be seen. Because of their relatively low
fees and low minimum account balances, robo-advisors can provide ﬁnancial advice to people who cannot afford it from traditional ﬁnancial advisors
and for whom many ﬁnancial advisors would not be willing to provide their
services. For this group, robo-advisors are clearly a better option than
human ﬁnancial advisors. A robo-advisor can steer young people who are
just starting out away from poor decisions such as inappropriate asset
allocations or the selection of overly-costly investments.
In addition, robo-advisors may be less likely to have conﬂicts of interest
related to the products they sell. This, however, may be undercut by the
growing trend toward robo-advisors being integrated into traditional fullservice banks, brokerages, and asset management ﬁrms.
In the future, robo-advisors can be expected to increase the sophistication
with which they identify individual differences in risk preference, as well as
other aspects of the advice and ﬁnancial management provided. To assess the
relative merits of robo-advisors versus ﬁnancial advisors fully, more information on and experience with robo-advisors is needed. It is likely that their
importance will grow over time as more new cohorts of investors use them and
as the asset balances of their current users increase, as they age.
The intangible component of human contact is one service that roboadvisors are unable to provide. The real or perceived value of this human
contact appears to be an important difference between robo-advisors and
traditional ﬁnancial advisors, and it likely explains the current trend toward
hybrid advisors that involve a robo-advisor working in partnership with a
traditional advisor. Such hybrids charge lower fees than traditional advisors,
but they still offer the possibility of talking with a ﬁnancial advisor and may
constitute the future of the ﬁnancial advisory industry.
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Notes
1. Chamber of Commerce v. US Dept. of Labor, 885 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2018). Following the
ruling, the US Department of Labor (2018) announced that it did not intend to enforce the
rule, pending further review.
2. The precursors to robo-advisors such as Mpower and Financial Engines were automated
services that employers provided to employees in their deﬁned contribution plans, but these
ﬁrms offered services directly to retail investors (Deschenes and Hammond 2019).
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